

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANA 03165 01 OF 03 131300Z

44

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 OMB-01 EUR-12 ACDA-05

SAJ-01 /071 W

----- 121475

O 131200Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6333

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 SANA 3165

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PINS, MASS, MARR, YE, SA

SUBJECT: SAUDI-YAR CRISIS?

REF: SANA 3055, 3138

1. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO GET CONFLICTING STORIES, AND LACK AUTHORITATIVE READING FROM HAMDI, THERE ARE NUMBER OF DETAILS WHICH WORTH REPORTING IN CONNECTION OUR CONCERN THAT YAR-SAUDI RELATIONS MAY BE APPROACHING CRISIS. FOR MOMENT WE THINK NO RPT NO NEW STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY USG-- APART FROM FAHD DEMARCHE AND CONTINUED INTELL LIASON. EMBASSY JIDDA VIEWS AND INFO RE SAUDI ATTITUDES URGENTLY NEEDED.

1. ON OCT 11 YARG CHIEF OF STAFF GHASHMI CALLED IN AMBASSADOR AND DATT TO BRIEF THEM ON RESULTS HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE WAS PERSONALLY AS FRIENDLY AS EVER BUT QUICKLY TURNED CONVERSATION TO CONCERNED DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SAUDIS ON ARMS PURCHASES. HE HAD EXPECTED--BASED ON WHAT SAUDIS TOLD YEMENIS (COMMENT-- SAUDIS TOLD US SAME) THAT AGREEMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED ON THIS VISIT. BUT IN COURSE OF FOUR LONG MEETINGS WITH SULTAN HE GOT LITTLE MORE THAN LCTURES ABOUT COMMUNISTS AND LEFTISTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANA 03165 01 OF 03 131300Z

IN YEMEN. THERE WAS NO RPT NO COMMITMENT TO ANY SPECIFICS

OR EVEN GENERALITIES ABOUT FUTURE PROGRAMS. HE SAID HE LEARNED NOTHING HE HAD NOT RPT NOT KNOWN BEFORE HE WENT. (SEE SEPTTEL FOR DETAILS)

2. CONFLICTING ACCOUNT OF MEETINGS COME FROM SAUDI MILATT HERE, WHO SAID DETAILS WERE DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH WITH GHASHMI--HE, THE MILATT WAS PRESENT FOR THE TALKS--AND THAT SAUDIS PLANS FOR PROGRAMS OF TRAINING, US ARMS PURCHASES, AND GENERAL FOLLOW-ON MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WERE EXPLAINED TO YEMENIS. PROGRAM, SAID MILATT WOULD BEGIN IN JANUARY.

3. SAUDI MILATT ADMITTED THAT NOTHING SIGNED AND SAID BLUNTLY THAT YEMENIS HAD NOT RPT NOT YET COMPLIED WITH SEVERAL SAUDIS CONDITIONS. HE MENTIONED TWO: A) TRANSFER OF PARATROOP UNITS IN SANA TO TIHAMA AND B) STRICE AMMO CONTROL FOR ALL YAR UNITS.

4. SAUDI MILATT ASSESSMENT OF VISIT IS THAN THAT IT WENT VERY WELL. GHASHMI BY CONTRAST SAID QUITE BLUNTLY HIS HEAD WAS ON BLOCK AS RESULT FAILURE OF TALKS AND THAT, WITH NOTHING TO SHOW, YARG WAS OBLIGED TO SEND PARATROOP COMMANDER COMMAND COUNCIL MEMBER ABDALLAH ABDAL ALIM TO SOVIET UNION. ABDAL ALIM VISIT, ACCORDING GHASHMI (WHO WITH HAMDI COMPOSES OTHER TWO COMMAND COUNCIL MEMBERS) WAS NOT RPT NOT TO DISCUSS ARMS IN SUBSTANTIVE WAY BUT TWO OTHER MISSIONS WERE PLANNED FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO OPEN THIS SUBJECT. OBVIOUSLY A RENEWAL OF SOVIET ARMS AID, GHASHMI SAID, WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO REMAIN AS CHIEF OF STAFF. HE HAD OPPOSED THIS AID TOO LONG AND TOO OPENLY.

5. GHASHMI SAID USG INTERESTS IN YEMEN WOULD BE FINISHED IN YEMEN IF SOVIET MILITARY AID RESUMED, AND THAT WE THEREFORE "HAD IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY" IN GETTING SAUDI ARMS AID BACK ON TRACK. HE SAID HE READY TO RETURN TO RIYADH ON DAY'S NOTICE TO GET REAL AGREEMENT.

6. WHILE GHASHMI DIDN'T SAY SO, IT UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD MAKE THIS DEMARCHE WITHOUT CLEARING IT WITH HAMDI. WE CANNOT CONVIRM THIS DIRECTLY AS PRESIDENT IS NOW GONE TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANA 03165 01 OF 03 131300Z

HODEIDA (AMBASSADOR HAS REQUESTED INTERVIW WITH HAMDI WD THROUGH BOTH GHASHMI AND PRIMIN ABDAL AZIZ ABDAL GHANI.) BEST ACCOUNT WE HAVE OF HIS REACTION IS REPORT OF JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR WHO WAS CALLED IN TO BE TOLD THAT GHASHMI VISIT WAS FAILURE, GOT NOTHING FROM SAUDIS, CREATED DEEP DOUBTS IN YEMEN ABOUT BONA FIDES AND INTENTIONS OF SAUDIS HERE, AND WAS FORCING YARG INTO DIFFICULT AND POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS EXAMINATION OF

ALTERNATIVES TO SAUDI AID. HADMI ASKED JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SEEK INTERVENTION KING HUSSEIN WITH SAUDIS. SO FAR JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR HAS NOT RPT NOT REPORTED THIS NOV 11 INTEVIEW WITH HAMDI, WAITING (AS WE HAVE) TO GET MORE FACTYRF PERHAPS LESS EMOTIONAL REACTIONS TO TURKI VISIT.

7. REACTION TO TURKI VISI DOES SEEM TO BE MODERATING WITH TIME. LAST NIGHT, 12 NOVEMBER, AMBASSADOR ASKED PRIMIN WHETHER RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA HEADED TOWARD CRISIS, POINTING OUT OUR GREAT CONCERN AND NEED TO KNOW IF THIS THE CASE. ABDAL AZIZ SAID MATTERS HAD NOT RPT NOT "REACHED THE POINT" BUT IT CLEAR FROM VISIT THAT SAUDIS DON'T WANT STRONAYV GOVERNMENT HERE AND MAY NOT EVEN WANT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. HE WILL AWARE OF TURKI'S FAVORABLE REPORTING ON HAMDI AND SAID TURKI MADE FEW DEMANDS, ALTHOUGH HE REPEATEDLY RAISED POSSIBILITY OF POSITION FOR ABDALLAH AL-AHAMR ON COMMAND COUNCIL AFTER ABDALLAH HAD REFUSED HAMDI OFFER OF JOB AS PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR. PROBLEM WITH FORMER JOB, SAID ABDAL AZIZ, IS THAT EVEN THOUGH IT DOES NOT FORMALLY BESTOW EXECUTIVE POWER ON ABDALLAH, IT WOULD PUT HIM IN PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND INEVITABLY LEAD TO INNUMERABLE SPECIAL REQUESTS--AS IN PAST--FOR PAYEMENTS, PROJECTS, JOBS, AND PUBLIC POSPIIONS WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO CREATING GOVERNMENT WITHIN GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD ALSO CREATE DEMANDS FOR SIMILIAR JOBS FOR OTHER TRIBAL LEADERS, WHO WOULD BE JEALOUS OF ABDALLAH.

8. ABDAL AZIZ WAS DELIBERATE AND COOL IN STATING THESE PROBLEMS, AND LACKED THE SHOW OF ANGER AND PERSONAL RANCOR THAT WE SAW IN SALEM BASINDWA, ABDALLAH AL-ASNAG, AHMED ABDO SAID AND OTHERS. (COMMENT: HOPEFULLY THIS MODERATION WILL COME TO CHARACTERISE OTHERS IN YARG TOO. AMBASSADOR STRONGLY URGED SUCH ATTITUDES ON ABDAL AZIZ, ARGUING IMPORTANCE, DEPENDABILITY, PROSPECTS OF SAUDI CONNECTIONUEAND LONG R
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 SANA 03165 01 OF 03 131300Z

UN BENEFITS OF TURKI, OTHER LIBERAL SAUDI
SUPPORT FOR HAMDI.

9. EMBASSY HAS NOW CONTACTED DIRECTLY VIRTUALLY ALL TOP ECHELON OF YARG (EXCEPT HAMDI AS NOTED ABOVE) AND CAN GIVE FOLLOWING PICTURE OF INNER CIRCLE VIEWS AND PLANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANA 03165 02 OF 03 131311Z

44

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 OMB-01 EUR-12 ACDA-05

SAJ-01 /071 W

----- 121651

O 131200Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6334

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

SECDEF/ISA/OSD/DSAA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 SANA 3165

10. YEMENIS FAITH IN SAUDI CONNECTION HAS BEEN BADLY SHAKEN BY TURKI VISIT, FAILURE OF GHASHMI MISSION TO GET ACTUAL AGREEMENTS, AND CONTINUED NON-ARRIVAL OF SAUDI SUBSIDY (WHICH ABDAL AZIZ SAYS IS FOR TWO QUARTERS, NOT ONE, AND THUS TOTALS ABOUT \$80 MILLION). THEY ARE CONVINCED SAUDIS OR MAYBE SOME SAUDIS--WANT STATE WITHIN A STATE HERE IN YEMEN, AND THEY WON'T RPT WON'T COMPROMISE ON THIS CRUCIAL POINT. CONDITION TO MOVE PARATROOPS TO TIHAMA, IF TRUE, IS CLEAR BID, MAKE SANA VULNERABLE TO TRIBES. PARATROOPS ARE TOUGHEST UNITS, ALL SOUTHERN AND SHAFEI FANATICALLY DEVOTED TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ZAYDI AND TRIBAL CONTROL. AMMO COODCOL FOR ARMY (WHEN TRIBES WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE SUCH CONTROL) IS SIMILAR BID TO MAKE GOVERNMENT HOSTAGE TO TRIBES. (SAUDIS MAY SEE BOTH STEPS AS WAY LIMIT LEFTISTS INFLUENCE ON HAMDI, PERHAPS KEEP HIM SAFE FROM COUPS.

IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE FOR HAMDI PERSONALLY AND FOR HIS PROGRAM TO COMPROMISE WITH SAUDIS ON OTHER POINT. (HAMDI STATED AS MUCH, ACCORDING TO JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR.) ABDALLAH AL-AHMAR PROBLEM NOT RESOLVED AT MOMENT, AND HAMDI NOT CERTAIN WHAT HE SHOULD DO NEXT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANA 03165 02 OF 03 131311Z

11. IN MEANTIME, YARG PROCEEDING ALONG SEVERAL COURSES OF ACTIONS.

12. FIRST, THEY ARE CRANKING UP DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION

FROM MUTUAL FRIENDS AND FROM THEIR OWN OFFICIALS. ASNAG FLEW YESTERDAY, NOV 12 TO KHARTOUM TO ENLIST AID OF NUMERI WITH SAUDIS. JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO HELP, AS WE HAVE. YEMENIS HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR CHARGE IN UAE TO BRIEF FAHD AND SEND LETTERS WITH BASINDWA TO KHALID AND SULTAN.

13. SECOND, THEY ARE FOR MOMENT PRETENDING FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION THAT NOTHING RPT NOTHING WRONRAWITH SAUDI-YAR JOINT AIRLINE VENTURE IN SAUDI CONNECTION. THEY APPROVED UNUSUAL JOINT CABINET-COMMAND COUNCIL MEETINHIYESTERDAY, AND ABDAL KARIM AL IRYANI IS ACCEPTING INVITATION VISIT RIYADH IN WEEK OR TEN DAYS TO SIGN LOAN AGTEEMENT NEGOTIATED IN AUGUST FOR ELECTRIC GRID. THEY ARE ALSO PRESUMABLY ARRANGING FOR YARG UNGA DELEGATION TO ABSENT ITSELF DURING KOREAN VOSTS. MOST IMPORTANT CABINET HAS BEEN TOLD OFFICIALLY--AND MAYBE MILITARY OFFICERS--THAT GHASHMI VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA WAS COMPLETE RPT COMPLETE SUCCESS. THESE ARE OBVIOUS BIDS FOR TIME, TO WIN PERIOD IN WHICH TO SEE WHAT SAUDIS INTEND TO DO.

14. BUT YEMENIS ALSO TRYING BLOW LIFE INTO ALTERNATIVES. MILITARY DELEGATIONS TO SOVIET UNION ARE OBVIOUS SIGNAL. WE HAVE REPORT FROM JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR THAT LIBYAN AID--WHICH WAS STOPPED FOR 300 SCHOOL TEACHERS HERE LAST MONTH BECAUSE OF SAUDI-YAR GOOD RELATIONS--IS IN HAMDI MIND A SHORT TERM RECOURSE, ALTHOUGH HAMDI DOES NOT RPT NOT THINK "CHILDISH" LIBYANS CAN BE DEPENDED UPON. YEMENIS HAVE ALSO TOLD US (COMMENT: WE ARE NOT CONVINCED) THAT THEY CAN SIMPLY DO WITHOUT SAUDI SUBSIDIES IF NECESSARY: CUT SALAIRES, EXPENSES, APPEAL TO NATIONAL PRIDE. (PERHAPS YAR COULD CONTINUE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO GET FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL OF REMITTANCES FOR SOME TIME, AND THUS AVOID SAME DEFLATION OF ECONOMY AS SUBSIDY COUT WOULD CAUSE IN GOVERNMENT).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANA 03165 02 OF 03 131311Z

15

WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW IS WHETHER HAMDI IS MANUEVERING IN MATTER OF ALTERNATIVES OR IF HE IS SERIOUS. HIS STYLE IS TO DO NOTHING PRECIPITOUSLY. HIS TEMPER IS BY GOOD REPORTS BACK UNDER CONTROL, AND HE WILL MOVE CAUTIOUSLY I.E. SEND ABDAL ALIM FOR VISIT WITH NO ARMS TALKS, PREDICT MILITARY VISITS WITH ARMS TALKS LATER ON. HAMDI MUST SEE, ALSO, THAT TO TAKE SOVIET ARMS AID AT THIS POINT HE WILL HAVE TO TAKE LEFTIS BACK INTO GOVERNMENT, EAT MUCH CROW, INCUR REAL SAUDI WRATH, AND, IN DUE COURSE, LOSE CONTROL. HE PROBABLY

SEES THAT SAUDIS, IN LAST YEAR, HAVE EXCELLENT RECORD OF DELIVERING OF AID AND WORKING OUT NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. SOVIETS WILL DEMAND AS LARGE OR LARGER POLITICAL PRICE FOR AID, MAY NOT DELIVER AT ALL (AS IN PAST) DUE TO CONNECTION WITH SOUTH YEMEN.

16. UNTIL AMBASSADOR SEES HAMDI, THIS VIEW MUST OF COURSE BE REPORTED AS SPECULATION.

17 WHAT NEXT?

18. THERE COULD BE TRIBAL TROUBLE IN NEXT TWO WEEKS, FOLLOWING END OF SORGHUM HARVEST WHICH NOW IN PROGRESS. AL-AHMAR MAY HAVE BEEN BASICALLY ENCOURAGED RATHER THAN DISCOURAGED BY TURKI VISIT. HE IS STILL SPREADING STORIES--AND MUHAHID ABU SHUWARIB IS APREADING ARMS--THAT HAMDI IS COMMUNIST, WILL CONFISCATE LAND FOR COOPERATIVES, NATIONALIZE WATER RIGHTS ETC. IN ANY CASE, HAMDI TAKING NO CHANCES WITH POSSIBILITY OF UPRISING. SANA IS RINGED BY TROOPS, WHICH DIGGING IN ON HODEIDA ROAD TO EAST AND AMRAN ROAD TO NORTH. AT MOMENT THIS IS LARGELY SHOW OF FORCE, IN OUR VIEW, RATHER COUNTER TO ACTUAL TRIBAL THREAT. OUR ASSESSMENT WHICH WE HAVE CHECKED AND RECHECKED IN LAST WEEK, REMAINS THAT TRIBES WON'T FOLLOW ABDALLAH AGAINST GOVERNMENT OR RISE BY THEMSELVES. HOWEVER, TROOPS IN TRIBAL AREAS ARE PROVOCATION. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME AMBIGUOUS REPORTS ON FIGHTING. AMERICANS IN AID PROJECTS NORTH OF CITY HAVE HEARD FIRING AND EXPLOSIONS--NO FURTHER DETAILS--AND HEARD STORIES OF FIGHTING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND TRIBAL LEVIES. AL-AHMAR IS SITTING IN KHAMER, LOOKING TO YARG, SAUDIS, HIS OWN CONSTITUENCY FOR NEXT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 SANA 03165 02 OF 03 131311Z

STEPS, AND WE HAVE OTHER REPORTS WHICH TEND TO MINIMIZE OUR CONCERN FOR CONFLICT. TRIBAL FIGHTING WOULD FOR INSTANCE NOT BE SO ALARMING AS GOVERNMENT TRIBAL CONFLICT. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE PULLED AMERICAN NORTH OF SANA BACK TO TOWN. BOTTOM LINE ON POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE, IN OUR VIEW, IS THAT THERE IS TIME (TWO WEEKS?) BEFORE ANYTHING WILL HAPPEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANA 03165 03 OF 03 131308Z

44

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 OMB-01 EUR-12 ACDA-05

SAJ-01 /071 W

----- 121610

O 131230Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6335

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

SECDEF/ISA/OSD/DSAA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 SANA 3165

-59. COMMENT: WE AREN'T SURE YET WHAT HAMDI IS UP TO. OUR TOP PRIORITY IS TO FIND OUT. OBVIOUSLY, THOUGH, IT EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO GET SAUDI VIEWS, AMEMBSSY JIDDA COMMENT ON RECENT EVENTS, AND POTENTIAL FOR TROUBLE. WE ALSO THINK THAT OUR VIEWS AND REPORTS SHOULD BE PASSED ALONG FOR INFORMATION TO SAUDIS. OUTCOME WILL ALSO DEPEND PARTLY ON SOVIET REACTIONS. WE WILL BE WATCHING FOR INFO ON THIS FRONT TOO. THEY MUST BE CONFOUNDED AND DELIGHTED AT THIS TURN OF EVENTS, WHICH THEY TRIED SO HARD--AND VAINLY-- TO MANUFACTURE. IF THEY CAME FORTH WITH PARTICULARLY JUICY ARMS DEAL--PARTICULARLY WHEN OUR "IMPACT" PACKAGE IS SO SMALL AND HAS DELIVERY DATES STRETCHING OUT TWO YEARS-- THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO HOOK THE RATTLED YEMENIS.

20. COMMENT: ANOTHER AREA OF CONCERN THIS EMBASSY IS WHAT WE URGE SAUDIS TO DO, IF ANYTHING. FOR MOMENT, WE THINK WE SHOULD DO NOTHING. WE CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT INTERESTED IN GETTING WHIPSAWED BY YEMENIS INTO GETTING SAUDIS TO SWEETEN DEAL. ON OTHER HAND, SAUDIS CONDITIONS MAY BE SOMETHING WE WISH TO RAISE WITH SAUDIS, IF CONDITIONS APPEAR TO BE QUEERING DEAL. IN ANY CASE, WE THINK GENERAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANA 03165 03 OF 03 131308Z

CONVERSATION WITH SAUDIS ALONG LINE OF EARLIER AUTHORITY FOR DEMARCHE TO FHAD WOULD STILL BE USEFUL. WE WELCOME EMBASSY JIDDA VIEWS ON THIS APPROACH AS WELL.

21. COMMENT: STORM SIGNALS ARE FLYING. OUR SANA 3055 COVERS PROBLEMS AS WE SEE FOR US INTERESTS. PROBLEMS, ARE SERIOUS AND LARGE. YAR-SAUDI CONFLICT (OR STAND-OFF) IS NOT RPT NOT IN OUR INTEREST. INCREASE OR EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE HERE ISN'T EITHER.
SCOTES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, POLITICAL SITUATION, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 NOV 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SANA03165
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750395-0572
From: SANA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751146/aaaabosy.tel
Line Count: 391
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 SANA 3055, 75 SANA 3138
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 AUG 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 AUG 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <17 DEC 2003 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SAUDI-YAR CRISIS?
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PINS, MASS, MARR, YE, SA
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006